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This paper tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is 
opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from 
mainly young firms. We find this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do 
so, we employ a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three digit 
manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for 
about 15 developed and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. We show 
that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher 
during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of 
corruption. We find the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number 
of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, 
including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation 
techniques. 
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This paper studies the effect of corruption on access to finance and its impact in times of 
systemic banking crises on the real sector. It asks the basic question: do incumbents try to 
curtail access to external finance for their competitors during systemic banking crises? 
Indeed, the paper empirically identifies access to finance as a likely candidate which 
incumbents may manipulate to “starve” their weaker competitors from credit during a 
crisis to safeguard their own rents. Hence this paper adds to the relatively small body of 
empirical literature on mechanisms through which access to finance affects real activity 
during financial crises. More specifically, it identifies an explicit “political economy of 
finance” channel through which special interests distort the level-playing field during 
crises. Furthermore, to the extent that the politics of incumbent rents affect the economic 
growth trajectory of a country, the results support the findings of the finance and growth 
literature and reconfirm the large literature which attests to the first order importance of 
institutions on economic development. 
  The basic idea originates from the theoretical model in Feijen and Perotti (2005) 
where rich entrepreneurs lobby politicians to restrict access to finance for poor 
entrepreneurs in bad economic times. It builds a model where all agents have identical, 
positive net present value projects and are all subject to an economy-wide exogenous 
shock with a certain probability. Agents have either high or low endowment (i.e., are rich 
or poor). In the event of a shock, all agents need to raise extra immediate funds 
externally. If they are unable to do so, they are forced to default inefficiently. Given the 
probability of a shock, the model predicts that rich entrepreneurs in countries with poor 
political checks and balances are more likely to lobby ex ante for lower investor 
protection. The motive is that in a context of low investor protection, poorer, more highly   3
leveraged entrepreneurs are denied the extra funds in case of a shock and are forced to 
exit the market, which raises the rents of the rich during a decrease in competition. In this 
paper, we test the general interpretation of this model: when outright denial of ex ante 
finance for entrants is impossible or too costly, connected firms will lobby for a fragile 
financial system which leads to a reduction of competition during an exogenous shock, 
like a banking crisis. 
To empirically test whether lobbying over access to finance is used by incumbents 
to reduce competition, we need a proxy to assess the effect of their ability to affect access 
to finance, thereby keeping their profits high. For this purpose, we interpret the change of 
the industry-level average Lerner index or price-cost margin (henceforth PCM) during a 
systemic banking crisis as a measure of profitability of “strong”, incumbent firms, which 
are most likely to withstand a crisis because they are well-connected. We are not the first 
one to analyze PCMs as a measure of (political) strength. Also Braun and Raddatz (2005) 
interpret change in PCMs during trade liberalization as a proxy for shift in the 
incumbent’s political and economic power. 
In the same spirit, we interpret fewer number of establishments (henceforth EST) 
during a crisis as more beneficial to incumbent or “strong” firms. Others also have 
analyzed the number of establishments of the data we use (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004; Perotti and Volpin, 
2004). 
We analyze the changes in PCM and EST associated with systemic banking crises 
across industries in both developed and developing countries. Industry-level PCMs are 
defined as total net profit over value of total output and are traditionally interpreted as a 
measure of incumbent monopoly rents and an inverse proxy for the degree of competition   4
in an industry. Theoretically, the PCM can range from zero to one, where a value of zero 
indicates an industry described by perfect competition. A value of one represents a pure 
monopolistic industry structure. However, in practice one needs to be a bit careful in 
interpreting PCMs as proxies for monopoly power, since the Lerner Index of monopoly 
power is calculated using marginal, not average costs and assumes the industry is in 
equilibrium. This is not too worrisome since we only need to interpret the PCM as a 
proxy for the average profitability in the industry. 
How does a systemic banking crisis affect the industry PCMs?
1 The adverse 
shock of a crisis increases the need for immediate capital because of, for example, 
possibly soaring input prices, an increasing interest burden on debt or banks that try to 
call in their outstanding loans due to their own liquidity constraints. Worse, the 
subsequent drying up of credit markets, a typical consequence of banking crises, could 
make firms even more tightly liquidity constrained, forcing them either to default, 
resulting in a reduction of the EST, or to downsize output substantially because of a 
shortage of working capital. This is exacerbated in most emerging markets, since bank 
lending is the most prevalent form of external finance. Indeed, Claessens, Djankov, and 
Ferri (1999) estimate that about 30 percent of corporations in crisis-affected East Asian 
countries were insolvent in the fall of 1998. More than twice as many firms in these 
countries suffered illiquidity. This results in a reduction of total output, which may have a 
positive effect on the PCM via upward pressure on prices, ceteris paribus.  
Incumbents benefit relatively more from a high PCM and a decrease in the EST. 
These “strong” firms have close ties with politicians and banks. Claessens et al. (2003) 
document that significantly fewer firms that were affiliated with firm groups or banks 
filed for bankruptcy, suggesting their connections provided them with the (financial)   5
means necessary to weather the crisis. Faccio (2004) finds that strong connections 
between firms and politicians are particularly common for large firms in countries that 
are generally perceived as being highly corrupt. She finds that businesspeople entering 
politics has a positive effect on the stock value of the associated companies. Fisman 
(2001) shows that the stock value of politically connected firms in Suharto’s Indonesia 
declined more when adverse rumors circulated about the health of the president. 
In addition, we assume “strong” firms are able and willing to press investors, 
notably banks, to make access to finance for “weak” firms more difficult in terms of rates 
and volume. The incentive to do so should be always present, but is even higher during a 
crisis when “weak” competitors are financially most vulnerable. Furthermore, we assume 
that average costs of “strong” firms do not increase relative to their “weaker” 
competitors. Again, we expect this is largely, but certainly not exclusively, due to the 
access to finance channel. For example, economies of scale, bribing or usage of political 
connections of “stronger” firms to pursue different channels to reach their goals could 
also adversely affect the change in relative average costs for “weaker” firms during 
crises. Demand changes during a crisis equally affect “strong” and “weak” firms, so if 
these assumptions are satisfied, higher industry-level PCMs during crises benefit “strong” 
firms more – or hurt them less - relative to “weak” firms.  
An analogous story can be told for the interpretation of the EST. If there is a 
significant decrease in the EST during a crisis, it is most likely that “weak” firms have 
left the market, which diminishes competition for “strong” firms. 
Under these assumptions, the main idea put forth in this paper is as follows. 
“Strong”, connected firms in industries where young firms are more dependent on 
external finance will be relatively more profitable during banking crises. Empirically, this   6
implies that in more corrupt countries during systemic banking crises, industries where 
young firms are more dependent on external finance experience: 
•  Hypothesis 1: higher price-cost margins (PCMs). 
•  Hypothesis 2: fewer number of establishments (EST). 
We find that the data support these hypotheses, even after performing an array of 
robustness checks. To consider the effect of the hypotheses, we use the regression 
coefficients to predict what the PCM difference would be between high dependent and 
less dependent industries for a high and a low corrupt country. This difference is 
relatively larger in more corrupt countries. The regression models predict that the 
difference in PCM change between a high and low dependent industry - the 75
th and 25
th 
percentile - to be 2.9 percent lower in a less corrupt country – taken at the 75
th percentile 
- compared to a high corrupt country – taken at the 25
th percentile (note that a higher 
corruption index means less corruption). For comparison, the average relative PCM 
change for the universe of calculated PCM changes is 5 percent. Therefore, a differential 
change of -2.9 percent due to an improvement in the corruption index from 3 to 4.1 
represents a large decrease. A similar analysis yields that the relative change in EST is 
2.1 percent higher due to an improvement in the corruption index from the 25
th to the 75
th 
percentile. Given that the average relative EST change during crisis is -5.2 percent, this a 
large increase.  
In addition, by adopting quantile regression techniques, we find that the effect of 
Hypothesis 1 is non-linear and is substantially magnified in those countries with very 
high levels of corruption. 
Interestingly, in the robustness checks, we find that PCMs in industries which are 
more “opaque”, i.e. divulge less information via prices in the stock market, have   7
relatively higher PCMs and less EST in countries which are more corrupt. This finding 
suggests that a “smoke screen” encourages manipulation to weaken competitors. 
Furthermore, there is a strong indication that the regressions do not suffer from 
endogeneity problems. There are at least two reasons. First, we use pre-crisis explanatory 
variables. Second, intuitively, it seems quite unlikely that the dependent variable has a 
direct contemporaneous effect on the level of corruption, since we know that institutions 
do not vary substantially over time or will only do so with large lags (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001)). 
A few remarks on the limitations of the results are in order. Besides the reliability 
of the data and the possible distortions which arise from a lack of data availability, the 
methodology leaves some questions unanswered. For instance, the data only allow us to 
treat the relationship between access to finance and corruption as a “black box”: we 
cannot infer how corruption affects access to finance. Furthermore, we are unable to infer 
whether the reduction in competition is welfare decreasing. For example, the data do not 
directly tell whether exiting or shrinking of some bad performing firms is actually 
welfare improving. Moreover, an industry with higher rents for firms can be welfare 
improving since it will have enough net worth to be less conducive to risk shifting 
incentives. Also, we are not able to assess the extent to which banks initiate the effect. In 
theory, banks may have strong incentives to deny access to credit to weaker, but 
otherwise healthy firms during banking crisis to artificially diminish competition and 
enhance the present value of their other outstanding loans in the industry. This is 
arguably easier to accomplish in countries with high corruption. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews the related 
literature and Section II explains the methodology used. Section III describes the data and   8
Section IV presents the main results. Section V presents the robustness checks of the 
main results and Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Related literature 
 
In this section we describe several parts of the economic literature relevant for this paper. 
Thus far, the literature has not paid much attention to the intersection of the real impact 
of crises, institutions, and access to finance. Therefore this paper is related to several 
parts of the finance literature. First, there is the literature which focuses on the 
relationship between institutions, financial development and economic growth. Its 
finance and growth strand has empirically established the connection between financial 
development and economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Jayratne and Strahan, 1996; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; 
Levine, 2005). More financially developed systems allow easier access to external 
finance by, for example, alleviating moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
enabling firms to grow faster. Access to finance alone is not enough. Johnson et al. 
(2002) show in a study on firms in post-communist countries that even thought bank 
loans are available, firms are reluctant to reinvest when property rights are weak. Braun 
and Raddatz (2005) offer a political economy view on financial development. They find 
that countries that liberalized their trade subsequently improved in terms of their financial 
development if the difference in change due to the liberalization of the average PCM of 
industries that benefited from liberalization was larger than that of industries that suffered 
from it. Also relevant is the law and finance strand, which established the link between 
the quality of the institutional framework and the development of the financial sector (La   9
Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; and Beck 
et al., 2003). 
  Second, there is a growing theoretical and empirical literature which documents 
or provides indirect evidence how political and economical elites use institutions to serve 
their own interests, often at the expense of competitors and social welfare. There is the 
general barriers to entry strand. Djankov et al. (2002) find that countries with higher 
corruption and larger unofficial economies tend to have higher barriers to entry as 
measured in terms of start up costs, number of procedures, etc. Their evidence is 
consistent with the view that these regulations primarily serve bureaucrats and politicians. 
Laeven, Klapper and Rajan (2004) document that entry regulations are associated with 
less efficient older firms and do not seem to be social welfare improving. He, Morck, and 
Yeung (2000) suggest that political rent-seeking by large established firms, especially in 
countries with fewer creditor rights, explains the relative stability in the list of countries´ 
top firms which is associated with slower economic growth. As already mentioned, 
Fisman (2001) shows that the stock value of politically connected firms in Suharto’s 
Indonesia declined more when adverse rumors circulated about the health of the 
president. Then there is the strand which focuses specifically on barriers to access to 
finance. Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesize that incumbents have incentives to 
oppose financial development because it breeds competition, hence eroding their rents. 
Perotti and Volpin (2004) describe a model in which rich entrepreneurs lobby politicians 
for poor minority protection to exclude product market competition of the poor because 
they cannot raise sufficient funds to undertake a project. Indeed they find some empirical 
support for their model. Cetorelli and Strahan (2004) document empirical evidence that in 
markets with few banks, entrants face greater difficulty in getting access to finance than   10
in markets where banks are more competitive. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2004) also report that high banking concentration is associated with higher financial 
barriers to entry, especially for small firms. Haber (2004) provides anecdotal support for 
the conjecture that the fast growth of the 19
th century Brazilian textile industry was 
associated with a less concentrated banking system, while the concentrated banking 
system in Mexico, characterized by connected lending, probably inhibited growth in this 
industry. Finally, there is the strand on connected lending which is relevant. In particular 
one finds excessive, socially harmful related lending in countries with poor institutions. 
Loans to political or industrial connections are subsidized and often turn out to be non-
performing. La Porta et al. (2002) find such evidence in Mexico, Laeven (2001) in 
Russia, and Kwaja and Mian (2004) in Pakistan. 
  Third, there is a large crisis literature. Banking crises seem to hamper growth of 
financially dependent industries. Laeven, Klingebiel, and Krozner (2002) document 
empirical evidence that industries which are more reliant on external finance grow slower 
as a result of banking crises in countries which are more financially developed, 
suggesting that access to finance in crises indeed is important. In addition, political and 
economic elites have an incentive to shift the burden of crises or at least suffer less from 
it, possibly magnifying the detrimental effects of the crisis in the process. Keefer 
(undated) builds a model where favors between special interests and politicians make the 
economy less resilient to external shocks and can lead to a financial crisis. Empirically, 
he finds that these factors largely explain the fiscal costs of a crisis. Halac and Schmukler 
(2003) find that in Latin America higher income classes did particularly better at the 
expense of social welfare due to financial transfers from banks during banking crises. 
Johnson and Mitton (2001) provide empirical evidence that the imposition of the   11
September 1998 Malaysian capital controls during the Asian financial crises benefited 
primarily firms with strong connections to Prime Minister Mahathir. Johnson et al. (1999) 
present empirical support that bad corporate governance, specifically a lack of minority 
shareholder protection, explains stock market declines better than the usual 
macroeconomic variables. They hypothesize that the drop in asset prices is because 




This section discusses the econometric methodology. We expand the methodology used 
in Rajan and Zingales (1998, RZ henceforth), which assesses the relationship between the 
cross-country real growth of sectoral value added and the level of sophistication of the 
financial system. Their main hypothesis is that if access to finance is paramount for firm 
growth, then real added value of industries which inherently rely more heavily on 
external finance should grow faster in countries with better developed financial systems. 
To curb identification problems and the criticism of omitted variable bias or model 
specification, they interact a country-specific variable (a proxy for the level of financial 
development) with an industry-specific variable (a proxy for dependence on external 
finance) besides using country- and industry-fixed effects in their regressions. To control 
for growth differences of industries across countries they use sectoral value added as a 
fraction of total value added in a country in 1980. A crucial assumption made by RZ is 
that industries in all countries have a natural external dependence level in common. They 
calculate this level by using industries in the United States as a benchmark. The rationale 
to use the United States is that, because its financial system is open and relatively   12
frictionless, it is easy for US firms to attain their desired financial structure. To overcome 
potential endogeneity problems, they drop the United States from the regressions. RZ 
find a positive and significant sign for the interaction between the level of financial 
development in a country and the industry-specific need for external finance, which 
supports their hypothesis: higher financial development indeed spurs industry growth 
more in industries which are more dependent on external finance. 
  First, we expand the RZ methodology to construct: 
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where subscript i indicates industries and subscript c countries in the database which 
experienced a systemic banking crisis. The dependent variable of interest,  c i, Y , is either 
the relative change of the industry-level PCM (DPCMREL) or the EST (DESTREL) 
during a crisis. To do so, we calculate the average industry PCM (EST) in the pre-crisis 
period and the crisis period. We define the pre-crisis period to be [t-8, t-3] and the crisis 
period as [t-1, t+1], where t is the first year of the first systemic banking crisis, as 
indicated by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Here I closely follow Laeven, Klingebiel, and 
Krozner (2005). They choose the pre-crisis period to end two years before the first date of 
the first crisis as reported in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) to ensure the calculations are 
not contaminated by the build-up towards the crisis. The crisis period is chosen around 
the first crisis date, because exact identification of the start of the crisis is difficult.   13





















DESTREL  for the EST. The 
dummies control for industry-fixed effects. On the country level, we use either dummies 
or country-level variables. Note that country dummies control, among others, for the 
severity of the crisis and the consequent impact on average demand. As a robustness 
check, we include country-level variables to control for a misspecification due to possible 
omitted institutional differences which impact the dependent variables and are correlated 
with the interaction terms in Equation (1).  c i,   level   crisis - Pre Y  is either 
c i, ) ( crisis pre PCM −  or  c i, ) ( crisis pre EST −  and controls for country-industry 
differences in the level of PCM (EST) before the crisis. Note that using pre-crisis values 
helps in avoiding endogeneity issues. The interaction term consists of the external 
dependence measure of young firms, taken from RZ, and a pre-crisis institution index. 
This is the average of the institution index of interest in the pre-crisis period, being law 
and order, accountability, corruption or a composite of the three. Institutions are better for 
higher values of the indices. We also use the pre-crisis values of the indices to avoid 
endogeneity problems. 
According to Hypothesis 1, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term,  2 β , 
to be negative and significant only when we use a corruption index in the interaction 
term. This means that for more dependent industries in less corrupt countries, the drop of 
its PCM during a crisis is significantly deeper. This implies that the depressing effect of 
weakening demand was not compensated for by the uplifting effect of a significant drop 
in output and competition, causing a larger slide of the PCM. Hence we can interpret this   14
as evidence that young firms in externally dependent sectors have better access to finance 
during a crisis in less corrupt countries. 
  According to Hypothesis 2, we expect the sign of the interaction term,  2 β , to be 
positive and significant only when we use a corruption index in the interaction term. This 
suggests that for more dependent industries in less corrupt countries, more (young) firms 




This section describes the construction and sources of the data which we used in the 
analyses. An overview of the variables we used, their definitions, and their sources can be 
found in Table I. 
The pair wise correlations between the country-level variables can be found in 
Panel A of Table II. Notice that the institutional indices (corruption, law and order, and 
accountability) are highly positively correlated. Domestic credit to GDP is also 
significantly positively correlated to most institutional indices, which is not surprising 
since this relationship is widely recognized in the finance and growth literature. In 
addition, GDP per capita is also highly correlated with the institutional indices and credit 
measures. Again, this finding corroborates with the institutions and growth literature and 
the financial development and growth literature. Furthermore, as expected, all corruption 
indices are highly positively correlated. Panel B provides correlations between the 
industry-level variables DPCMREL, DPCM, DESTREL, and DEST. As expected, there 
is a significant negative correlation between the absolute difference in the number of   15
establishments (DEST) and the absolute difference of PCMs (DPCM), implying that 
higher PCMs are associated with fewer establishments. 
Summary statistics for the datasets used in the regressions are in Table III. They 
can be found in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. 
Note that the price-cost margin increases and the number of establishments 
decreases on average during a crisis. 
We collected industry-level data over the period 1963-2002 from the ISIC three-
digit level Industrial Statistics (IndStat) database compiled by the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) as it is dissipated via the World Bank’s 
Statistical Information Management and Analysis system (SIMA). The database covers, 
among others, information on industry-level total value added, total value of output and 
total cost of wages and salaries, and the EST for 28 industries in 175 countries, although 
there are many missing observations 
2. We construct the industry-level PCM for each 
year for which data are available, by calculating 
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Note that although the establishments reported in the UNIDO database do not 
coincide with the legal boundaries of a firm, it can be interpreted as the number of 
competitors in the industry since it is defined as a “unit which engages, under a single 
ownership or control, in one, or predominantly in one, kind of activity at a single 
location”. 
  To identify system banking crisis periods, we used Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
This database describes 113 banking crises in 93 countries since the 1970s. Like Laeven,   16
Klingebiel, and Krozner (2005), we restrict our analysis to the first systemic banking 
crisis in a country to avoid identification problems in case of multiple crises. 
  We took the industry-level external dependence measures for mature, young, and 
all firms directly from RZ. Tabel IV lists the data. External financial dependence of a 
firm is measured as the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal cash 
flows of US firms using COMPUSTAT. RZ take the median external financial 
dependence of all firms in the industry to reflect the extent to which the whole industry is 
dependent on external finance. RZ do not report values for Industrial Chemicals, ISIC 
code 351, so we draw this information from Laeven, Klingebiel, and Krozner (2005). 
Note that younger firms are often significantly more reliant on external finance. 
  We collected institutional indices for the period 1984-2004 of Accountability, 
Corruption, and Law and Order from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), an 
independent source, widely used by both academia and business (see for example, La 
Porta, 1998). All indices are on a scale from 0 to 6, where a higher value means a better 
institution. We also constructed an institutional index as a composite of the individual 
accountability, corruption, and law and order indices, to obtain a robust estimate of the 
quality of institutions. Accountability is concerned with “how responsive the government 
is to its people.” The Corruption index measures the extent to which “excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors‘, secret party funding and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business” are found in a country. 
Importantly, it also takes corruption practices regarding loans into account. The Law and 
Order index assesses “the strength and impartiality of the legal system and […] popular 
observance of the law.” For all indices, we calculated simple yearly averages, since 
ICRG reports monthly data.   17
To construct the dataset for DPCMREL, we started with the UNIDO database and 
cleaned the data by excluding observations where value added exceeded the value of 
output (7,785 observations) and wages and salaries exceeded value added (4,776 
observations). Because of missing variables, we are able to construct DPCMREL for 915 
observations. ICRG coverage of institutional variables starts in 1984, therefore the set 
decreases to 340 observations. Because we have no external dependence measure for 
Industrial Chemicals and Tobacco, we lose another 24 observations. Hence, we end up 
with a dataset containing 316 observations, which includes Algeria, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Madagascar, Panama, Poland, Senegal, 
Sweden, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Coverage is good (over 20 industries per 
country on average), however Algeria has 1 observation. 
To construct the dataset for DESTREL, we started with the UNIDO database and 
cleaned the data as already described. Because of missing variables, we are able to 
construct DESTREL for 583 observations. ICRG coverage of institutional variables starts 
in 1984, therefore the dataset shrinks further to 324 observations. Because we have no 
external dependence measure for Industrial Chemicals and Tobacco, we lose another 23 
observations. Like Laeven, Klingebiel, and Krozner (2002), we drop observations for 
industries which have increased over 100% during the crisis-period, since this is most 
probably due to increased coverage or reclassification of firms. Hence, we end up with a 
dataset containing 260 observations, which includes Brazil, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Panama, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Venezuela, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Coverage of industries is good (on average more than 20 industries), except 
for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Senegal which have fewer than 3 observations.   18
The constructed datasets only contain countries that experienced crises in the late 
1980s and 1990s. The average number of observations per country is around 20 out of 28 
industries. Tables V and VI provide an overview of the averages of variables used for the 
regressions with the relative changes in PCM and EST, respectively. 
  In the robustness checks, we also use GDP per capita, inflation, and domestic 
credit to GDP as country-level controls. All are drawn from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. We collected three other corruption indices. We use the 
Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International (henceforth TI). Since this 
index was first constructed in 1995 and has limited coverage, we use an average of the 
index for the period 1996-1997. We also collected a second corruption index by Beck et 
al. (2000, henceforth when referring to the indicator: Beck), which is an average for the 
period 1982-1995. Finally, we use the corruption index of Kaufman and Kraay (1999, 
henceforth KKZ). 
 
IV. Main Results 
 
This section deals with the main results of the paper and some initial robustness checks. 
All standard errors for OLS regressions reported in the paper are robust to 
heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White estimator of variance. In the main results, we 
focus on access to finance for young firms as being the specific channel through which 
DPCMREL and DESTREL are affected. For DPCMREL, the results are reported in 
Table VII, Columns (1)-(4), where external dependence is interacted with several 
institutional indices. They reflect the basic result for Hypothesis 1 of the paper.   19
We can see that the interaction term for corruption is significant on the 1% level 
and positive, suggesting that indeed PCMs are higher during crises in industries which 
are dependent on external finance in countries with higher corruption, also after 
controlling for financial development, presented in Columns (5)-(8). Corruption seems to 
be the most important factor, since the interaction term of external dependence and other 
institutional indices are not significant. This provides a robustness check on the channel 
of corruption. Only in Column (8) is the interaction of the average institutional index is 
significant, which is probably driven by the Corruption index. 
We can use the regression coefficient estimates of Table VII to infer how much 
deeper the relative PCM would fall of an industry at the 75
th percentile of financial 
dependence compared to an industry at the 25
th percentile level, when the industries are 
located in a country at the 75
th percentile of corruption, rather than in a country at the 25
th 
percentile. The industry at the 75
th percentile, Petroleum Refineries, has an external 
dependence measure of 0.85. The industry at the 25
th percentile, Wood Products, has a 
dependence measure of 0.34. The country at the 75
th percentile of corruption has a value 
of 4.1 for the corruption index and the countries at the 25
th percentile have a value of 3. 
The estimated coefficient for the interaction term in Regression 5 of Table VII equals -
0.052 and we can set the industry’s initial share of manufacturing at its overall mean. The 
regression coefficient estimates therefore predicts the difference in relative PCM change 
between the 75
th and 25
th percentile of external dependence is 2.9 percent lower in a 
country with a corruption index of 3 compared to one with an index of 4.1. For 
comparison, the average relative PCM change during crisis is 5 percent. Therefore, a 
differential change of -2.9 percent due to an improvement in the corruption index from 3 
to 4.1 represents a large decrease.   20
For DESTREL, the main results can be found in Table VIII, Columns (1)-(4), 
where external dependence is interacted with several institutional indices. They reflect 
the basic result for Hypothesis 2 of the paper. 
Only the interaction term with the Corruption index is significant (on the 5% 
level), which identifies corruption as the most important channel. Using the regression 
coefficient of the interaction term with corruption (0.037) of Regression 5, a relative EST 
change between the 75
th and 25
th percentile of external dependence is 2.1 percent higher 
in a country with a corruption index of 3 compared to one with an index of 4.1. For 
comparison, the average relative EST change during crisis is -5.2 percent.
3 Therefore, a 
differential change of 2.1 percent due to an improvement in the corruption index from 3 
to 4.1 represents a large increase. 
 
V. Robustness Checks 
 
This section contains several robustness checks of the main result. Tables VII and VIII 
showed that the results are robust to controlling for financial development. 
First, the data seem to support that indeed young firms are most adversely affected. We 
conclude this because the results in Tables VIII and IX can not be replicated when using 
the external dependence measure of RZ for all firms. In that case none of the interaction 
terms are significant. These results are presented in Table IX, Columns (1) and (3). 
Furthermore, we ran the regressions using the difference in external dependence 
between young and mature firms instead of young firms only (Columns (2) and (4)). The 
intuition is that we expect even more malpractices in industries where the external 
dependence gap between young and mature firms is large. However, only for DESTREL   21
is the interaction term significant (at the 10% level) and marginally so for DPCMREL (at 
the 10.7% level)
4. The results in Columns (2) and (4) need not be surprising. If indeed 
connections are important, even mature firms which are also highly dependent on 
external finance would be able to get access to finance themselves, while lobbying to 
exclude others. 
Second, the results in Tables VII and VIII are robust to omitting outliers. We 
checked this by running the basic regressions after cutting of the 1% and 5% tails of the 
distribution of the dependent variable, and using robust estimation techniques like 
Iteratively Weighted Least Squares regressions and Absolute Least Value regressions
5. 
Third, the results are robust to using an alternative measure of financial 
development: total domestic credit to GDP. The results are reported in Table X. 
Fourth, to check the results we used three different corruption measures. We took 
an average of the Corruption Perceptions Index in the period 1996-1997
6 from 
Transparency International. In addition, we adopted the corruption index from Beck et al. 
(2000), which is an average over the period 1982-1995. Lastly, we used the KKZ index 
of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). All indices are ranged on a scale from 
1-10, where a higher score indicates less corruption. The number of observations differ 
however greatly over the specifications, because coverage of corruption indices is in 
general poor for the 1980s and early 1990s. Tabel XI presents the results.  
The interaction terms with the Transparency International index and the KKZ index 
confirm the results. However, the Beck et al. (2000) indicator does not produce 
significant results when explaining DESTREL, despite the fact that all corruption 
measures are highly positively correlated.   22
  Fifth, there might be a misspecification when the interaction term is correlated 
with omitted country variables which affect the dependent variable. Therefore we 
dropped the country-level variables and used other country controls. We employed GDP 
per capita, inflation, total domestic credit over GDP, domestic credit via banks over GDP, 
and the corruption index. As usual, the controls are pre-crisis averages. Table XII reports 
the results. 
The results are robust to different specifications, and get stronger when more variables 
are added to the model. Although the sample size shrinks when more variables are added, 
it is noteworthy to state that the coefficients are close to the coefficients in the main 
results. 
  Sixth, as a further robustness check, we transformed the corruption variable in the 
interaction term into a dummy which takes a value of one if the corruption index is higher 
than the median, and zero otherwise. This new interaction term is positive and highly 
significant for DESTREL (Table XIII, Column (6)). However, it is no longer significant 
when explaining DPCMREL (Table XIII, Column (3)). To investigate this, we ran the 
regressions for the sub samples which have higher and lower values of corruption. To 
reduce the effect of outliers, the 1% tails of the dependent variable are dropped. (7 
observations) Table XIII reports the results. 
Column (1) shows that for the most corrupt countries, the interaction term is again 
significant. However, it is not for countries with low levels of corruption (Column (2)). 
To check for non-linearity, we added a second interaction term with a squared corruption 
index (Column (3)). Both interaction terms are also highly significant for the complete 
sample, using Iteratively Weighted Least Squares to reduce the impact of outliers. The 
coefficients indicate that when the corruption index takes on a value of around 4.6, the   23
marginal effect of the interaction terms is almost zero. Hence, these results indicate that 
impact of the interaction term is largest for the most corrupt countries. To check this, we 
ran three quantile regressions (for 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9)
7. We expect that the effect is highest 
for the highest quantile of the DPCMREL distribution, since the hypothesis indicates 
those countries should be most corrupt. Indeed, Columns (4)-(6) show that the value of 
the interaction term doubles for the 0.9 quantile relative to the other quantiles. Although 
we don’t provide a theory for the decreasing coefficient for the pre-crisis PCM, this 
perhaps can be interpreted that collusive behavior becomes unsustainable in the event of 
an exogenous shock. 
Seventh, the results are robust to including time dummies to correct for the 
general external environment of the crisis (not reported). 
Eighth, the country dummies implicitly control for the severity of the crisis and 
the accompanying effect of a currency devaluation on the terms of trade. However in 
addition to Table XII, we also explicitly want to control for changes in the terms of trade. 
Table XIV produces the results. The interaction term with corruption remains significant 
for both the change in PCM as the number of establishments. 
  Finally, we performed a more general check whether access to finance is 
opportunistically curtailed for young firms. We explored the effect of the informativeness 
of industries on the dependent variables. Informativeness can be seen as a proxy for 
financial development. Since, unlike RZ’s external dependence, this index is not based on 
accounting measures, it is more exogenous to the model. In doing so, we ran a regression 
similar to Equation (1): 
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where  i eness Informativ  is substituted for external financial dependence. This index 
measures how much information is conveyed by movements in industry stock market 
prices in the United States in the period 1980-1982
8. It is based on the idea of Durnev, 
Morck and Yeung (2004) that higher stock price comovement reveals less industry-
specific information. Hence, an industry can be considered more opaque for lower index 
values. Intuitively, PCM and EST are more susceptible to malpractices in opaque 
industries, which are more easily manipulated due to a lack of outside scrutiny. 
Therefore, we expect the interaction term to be significant and positive when  c i, Y  is 
DPCMREL, suggesting that in more opaque industries in countries which are corrupt, the 
PMC is relatively high during crises. We expect the opposite to be true for DESTREL. 
The results are reported in columns (1)-(4) of Table XV. Explaining DPCMREL in 
Column (1) and (2), we see that the interaction term is highly significant at the 1% level 
and has the expected sign, also after controlling for financial development of the banking 
system. The effect is as expected, but less strong when trying to explain DESTREL in 
Column (1) and (2), and only significant at the 10% level after controlling for financial 
development. Interestingly, the informativeness measure and the external dependence of 
young firms is negative and significant (ρ= -0.67 and p=0.00) and less so for dependence 
of all firms (ρ= -0.36 and p=0.01). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The main question this paper addresses is whether incumbents use their connections to 
curtail access to finance during a systemic banking crisis to weaken or even eliminate 
their younger competitors. The data provide support for this view. Our main finding is 
that industries in which young firms are highly dependent on external finance have (1) 
relatively high price-cost margins (PCMs) and (2) relatively fewer establishments during 
systemic banking crises in countries with higher corruption indices. These results 
withstand an array of robustness checks, including different controls, and robust 
estimation techniques. Combined, we can regard these results as indirect evidence that 
powerful interests – strong, well-connected firms and/or their banks – are able to restrict 
access to finance during a crisis for younger firms, forcing them to significantly reduce 
output or even to default. Furthermore, we find that the described effect on the relative 
PCM change is disproportionately higher in countries with higher corruption. 
Interestingly, we also find that the PCM is higher during crises in informationally more 
opaque industries –a measure of industry stock price comovement- in more corrupt 
countries experience relatively higher PCMs, suggesting that a “smoke screen” leads to 
malpractices in general, where the financial channel is just one of many ways to weaken 
competitors. 
  The findings may have policy implications. They indicate that the effect of 
corruption on access to finance can play an important role in the impact of banking crises 
on the post-crisis structure of the real sector.   26
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the causes and effects of the East-Asian crisis on corporate sectors, see Claessens et al. 
 (2000). 
2 Some countries can have changed names, like, for example, Yemen, and have multiple entries in the 
database. 
3 -5.2% is the average for the universe for which DESTREL could be calculated. The average for the 
sample used for the regressions can be found in Table III. 
4 However, when the 1% tails of the DPCMREL distribution are dropped, the interaction terms become 
significant for both new measures of external dependence. 
5 Iteratively Least Squares takes outliers into account by assigning a weight to each observation with higher 
weights given to “better behaved” observations. Least Absolute Values is in fact a median regression where 
the absolute deviations from the median are used to calculate the coefficients. 
6 Transparency International started constructing the index in 1995, but not for all countries. Therefore we 
use 1996 and 1997. 
7 Quantile regressions use the whole sample to estimate the coefficients for the conditional expected value 
of the desired quantile. The 0.5-quantile is a special case, where the conditional median value is estimated. 
8 We took the measure from Huang (2005). Huang reports that this index does not change much over time. 
Huang follows Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) and uses “relative firm-specific stock return variations” 
to measure stock price informativeness at the industry level.   32
Table I 
 
Definition and Source of Variables 
 
This table describes all the variables we use. The first column gives the name of the variable. The second column 





The relative change of the average industry level Price Cost Margin in the systemic banking crisis period 
relative to the pre-crisis period (definition in text). The Price Cost Margin (PCM) itself is calculated by value 
added minus wages and salaries over value of output. Where wages and salaries and value added are not 





The relative change of the average number of establishments (EST) in the systemic banking crisis period 






The average industry level Price Cost Margin (EST) in the pre-crisis period. Source: UNIDO IndStat ISIC 
level 3 1963-2003; own calculations. 
 
Terms of Trade  The relative change of in the terms of trade during the banking crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period. 





Median external financial dependence of young U.S. firms by ISIC sector averaged over the period 1980-
1989. Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Accountability 
 
The average of the Accountability index in the pre-crisis period. The index is on a scale from 0 to 6. A higher 
index means higher accountability. The index is concerned with “how responsive the government is to its 
people.” We use the average value of the index in the pre-crisis period. Source: International Country Risk 




The average of the Corruption index in the pre-crisis period. The index is on a scale from 0 to 6. A higher 
index means lower corruption. The index is concerned with “excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 
‘favor-for-favors‘, secret party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.” Source: 
International Country Risk Guide. 
 
Law and Order 
 
The average of the Law and Order index in the pre-crisis period. The index is on a scale from 0 to 6. A higher 
index means better law and order. The index is concerned with “[assessing] the strength and impartiality of 




The simple average of Law And Order, Corruption, and Accountability. Source: International Country Risk 
Guide; own calculations. 
Corruption 
(Beck) 
Measure of corruption, with the scale readjusted to 0 (high level of corruption) to 10 (low level). Data are 
averaged over 1982-1995. Higher values correspond to better governance. Source: Beck et al. (2000). 
 
Corruption (TI)  The average Corruption Perceptions Index of a country over 1996 and 1997. The CPI focuses on corruption in 
the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The index is on a scale 
from 1 to 10. Source: Transparency International. 
 
KKZ  A composite of six governance indicators (1998 data): voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption. Higher values correspond to better governance.  
Source: Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). 
 
Total Credit to 
GDP 
Average total domestic (% of GDP) in the pre-crisis period. Source: World Development Indicators. 
 
Credit via banks 
to GDP 
 
Average domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) in the pre-crisis period. Source: World 
Development Indicators. 
Inflation  Average inflation in the pre-crisis period. Source: World Development Indicators. 
 





This table describes pair wise correlations. Panel A contains country-level variables. Panel B contains country/industry-
level variables. *, ** indicate significance at 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
Panel A: 
  COR ACC LAW  CRED 
DOM-
PRIV  GDPC INFL  COR(TI) 
COR 
(KKZ)  COR(B) 
                 
C O R   1 . 0 0            
            
ACC  0.73**  1.00          
            
LAW  0.77**  0.55**  1.00         
            
CRED 0.15  0.26  0.07  1.00        
  0.48  0.20  0.73         
            
DOMPRIV  0.47*  0.51**  0.58**  0.68**  1.00       
            
GDP  0.67** 0.62** 0.72** 0.41** 0.68** 1.00         
            
INFLATION  -0.23 -0.16 -0.47*  -0.08  -0.19  -0.17  1.00     
            
COR  (TI)  0.91** 0.77** 0.85** 0.50** 0.50** 0.85**  -0.26  1.00     
            
COR  (KKZ)  0.89** 0.72** 0.81** 0.31*  0.47** 0.76**  -0.20  0.91** 1.00   
            
COR  (B)  0.97** 0.80** 0.90** 0.26  0.63** 0.80**  -0.22  0.88** 0.80** 1.00 
 
Panel B: 
 DPCMREL  DPCM  DESTREL  DEST 
       
DPCMREL 1.00       
        
DPCM 0.76**  1.00     
        
DESTREL -0.07  -0.13*  1.00   
        
DEST -0.06  -0.15**  0.19**  1.00   34
Table III 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Basic Datasets Used 
 
This table reports summary statistics. It displays the variable, the number of observations, its arithmetic mean, its 
standard deviation and its minimum and maximum values. Panel A pertains to the regressions with the relative change 
in price-cost margins (DPCMREL) during a systemic banking crisis as the dependent variable. Panel B contains 
statistics for the regressions using the relative change in the number of establishments (DESTREL) as the dependent 
variable. DPCM and DEST denote the absolute changes during a crisis for the Price-Cost Margin (PCM) and the 
number of establishments (EST), respectively. 
 
Panel A: 
Variable Observations  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
DPCMREL 340  0.05  0.65  -0.97  8.02 
DPCM 340  -0.01  0.10  -0.36  0.55 
Pre crisis PCM  340  0.28  0.11  0.02  0.75 
Corruption 340  3.75  1.35  1.60  6.00 
Accountability 340  3.90  1.53  1.86  6.00 
Law and Order  340  3.77  1.49  1.70  6.00 
Credit via banks to GDP (%)  340  72.92  52.50  5.36  223.71 
Credit to GDP (%)  340  51.70  37.89  4.45  153.53 
GDP per capita  313  9310.78  11104.96  300.15  32053.45 
Corruption (TI)  340  29.47  57.56  1.38  338.45 
Corruption (KKZ)  242  0.52  0.79  -0.76  1.62 
Corruption (Beck)  203  5.75  2.55  2.64  9.26 
 
Panel B: 
Variable Observations  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
DESTREL   260  0.02  0.34  -1.00  1.00 
DEST 260  -239.93  2129.72  -27143.00  4226.67 
Pre crisis EST  260  2469.97  7416.45  1.00  50689.60 
Corruption 260  3.73  1.49  1.60  6.00 
Accountability 260  3.91  1.63  1.86  6.00 
Law and Order  260  3.66  1.56  1.70  6.00 
Credit via banks to GDP (%)  260  72.41  55.99  5.36  223.71 
Credit to GDP (%)  260  54.35  40.76  4.45  153.53 
GDP per capita  235  10946.60  11725.52  492.29  32053.45 
Corruption (TI)  163  5.89  2.71  2.64  9.26 
Corruption (KKZ)  208  0.47  0.81  -0.76  1.62 
Corruption (Beck)  189  6.82  2.39  3.51  10.00   35
Table IV 
 
External Financial Dependence of US Firms in the Period 1980-1989 
 
This table reports the median level of external financing needs during 1980-1989 on the three-digit ISIC level. The 
higher the index the more dependent is the industry on external finance. External dependence is measured as the 
fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal cash flows. The data is directly from Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). The data for Industrial chemicals, ISIC code 351, is from Laeven, Klingebiel, and Krozner (2002). 
 
    Age  of  company 
ISIC code  Industrial sector  All  Mature  Young 
313 Beverages  0.08  -0.15  0.63 
311 Food  products  0.14  -0.05  0.66 
324 Footwear  -0.08  -0.57  0.65 
332 Furniture  0.24  0.33  0.68 
351 Industrial  chemicals  0.25  -  - 
362 Glass  0.53  0.03  1.52 
371  Iron and steel  0.09  0.09  0.26 
323 Leather  -0.14  -1.33  -1.53 
382 Machinery  0.45  0.22  0.75 
383 Electric  machinery  0.77  0.23  1.22 
381 Metal  products  0.24  0.04  0.87 
372 Non-ferrous  metal  0.01  0.07  0.46 
369 Non-metal  products  0.06  0.15  -0.03 
352 Other  chemicals  0.22  -0.18  1.35 
390 Other  industries  0.47  -0.05  0.8 
341  Paper and products  0.18  0.1  0.57 
354  Petroleum and coal products  0.33  0.16  -0.26 
353 Petroleum  refineries  0.04  -0.02  0.85 
356 Plastic  products  1.14  -  1.14 
361 Pottery  -0.15  0.16  -0.41 
342 Printing  and  publishing  0.2  0.14  0.6 
385 Professional  goods  0.96  0.19  1.63 
355 Rubber  products  0.23  -0.12  0.5 
321 Textile  0.4  0.14  0.66 
314 Tobacco  -0.45  -0.38  - 
384 Transportation  equipment  0.31  0.16  0.58 
322 Apparel  0.03  -0.02  0.27 
331 Wood  products  0.28  0.25  0.34 
   36
Table V 
 
Country-level Averages of Variables Used in Basic Regressions with the Change in Price-Cost Margins as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table shows summary statistics on the national level for which we have enough data to construct differences in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) between the 
crisis and pre-crisis period. The PCM is defined as value added minus wages and salaries over value of total output. The pre-crisis period is defined as [t-8, t-3] and the crisis 
period is defined as [t-1, t+1], where t is the first year of the first systemic banking crisis in a country according to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). DPCM is the absolute 
difference in PCM between the crisis and the pre-crisis period. DPCMREL is the relative difference. The Corruption, Accountability, and Law and Order institutional indices 
are on a scale from 0 to 6, where a higher score indicates a better institution. The Institutional index is a composite of all institutional indices. Institutional indices are drawn 
from ICRG. Credit via Banks is the domestic credit as a % of GDP from the WDI. Credit to GDP, GDP per capita, and Inflation are all from the WDI. Corruption (TI) is the 
perceived corruption index by Transparency International. The Corruption (Beck) measure is from Beck et al. (2000). The external dependence measures are based on Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). 
 






















capita  Inflation 
Algeria  1990  1 -0.056 -0.194  0.291 3.667  2.000  2.000  2.556 -  -  -  87.565  59.108  1796.908  10.323 
Brazil  1990  11 0.106 0.359  0.348  3.806 3.861 3.861 3.843  3.260  0.000  6.310  51.421  44.580  3952.198  160.165 
Bulgaria  1995  8 -0.023  0.114  0.232 3.083  3.083  5.000  3.722 -  -  - 118.516  7.204  1586.882  338.449 
Finland  1991  28 -0.022 -0.034  0.237 6.000  6.000  6.000  6.000 9.265  1.620  10.000  58.885  61.513  23276.260  5.657 
Hungary  1991  27 -0.039  0.074  0.202 4.000  4.667  5.000  4.556 5.020  0.870  -  99.867  51.375  4686.407  7.207 
Indonesia  1997  26 0.002 0.015  0.290  1.600 3.000 2.833 2.478  2.685  -0.760  - 43.983  44.164  827.386  8.171 
Japan 1991  28 0.024 0.113  0.242  5.000 6.000 5.000 5.333  6.810  0.950  8.512  223.709  153.530  32053.450  1.384 
Korea  1997  28 0.038 0.141  0.312  4.100 2.550 2.150 2.933  -  -  5.298  63.100  62.312  8847.052  6.937 
Madagascar  1988  20 -0.011  0.063  0.226 4.000  4.000  4.000  4.000 -  0.110  -  41.267  18.628  300.380  22.097 
Panama  1988  22 -0.040 -0.133  0.311 2.000  2.167  2.000  2.056 -  0.700  3.512  68.709  56.907  2837.189  5.809 
Poland  1990  28 0.059 1.282  0.333  3.679 1.862 4.000 3.180  5.325  -  -  5.361  4.448   37.150 
Senegal  1988  17 -0.005  0.046  0.163 3.000  2.000  2.000  2.333 -  1.530  5.000  51.947  41.651  564.594  11.084 
Sweden  1991  28 -0.077 -0.248  0.296 6.000  6.000  6.000  6.000 9.215  -0.370  10.000  105.048  85.205  25455.040  6.543 
Venezuela  1994  28 0.018 0.104  0.319  3.000 5.000 4.000 4.000  2.635  -0.200  4.702  46.149  42.189  3450.689  38.853 
Zambia  1995  17 -0.149 -0.184  0.373 2.000  2.117  1.700  1.939 -  -  -  64.679  9.063  492.290  84.339 
Zimbabwe  1995  25 -0.031 -0.066  0.327 3.000  3.750  2.000  2.917 -  0.445  5.417  40.611  20.505  634.638  14.696 
Average    21.375  -0.013 0.091  0.281  3.621 3.629 3.597 3.615  5.527  -  6.528  73.176  47.649  7384.091  47.429   37
Table VI 
 
Country-level Averages of Variables Used in Basic Regressions with Change in the EST as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table shows averages of variables on the national level which we used for regressions with as dependent variable the relative change in industry-level number of 
establishments (DESTREL) between the crisis and pre-crisis period. We excluded observations whose DESTREL was not in the interval (-1,1). The pre-crisis period is 
defined as [t-8, t-3] and the crisis period is defined as [t-1, t+1], where t is the first year of the first systemic banking crisis in a country according to Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003). DEST is the absolute difference in the EST between the crisis and the pre-crisis period. DESTREL is the relative difference. The corruption, Accountability, and Law 
and Order institutional indices are on a scale from 0 to 6, where a higher score indicates a better institution. The institutional index is a composite of all institutional indices. 
Institutional indices are drawn from ICRG. Credit via Bank (%) is the domestic credit as a % of GDP from the WDI. Credit to GDP, GDP per capita, and Inflation are all 
from the WDI. Corruption (TI) is the perceived corruption index by Transparency International. The Corruption (Beck) measure is from Beck et al. (2000). The external 
dependence measures are based on Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
 






















capita  Inflation 
Algeria 1990 1  794.000  1.698  467.667  3.667  2.000  2.000  2.556  -  -  -  87.565  59.108  1796.908 10.323 
Brazil  1990 11 -6569.182  -0.725  8126.182  3.806  3.861  3.861  3.843  3.260  0.000  6.310  51.421  44.580  3952.198 160.165 
Bulgaria 1995  8  1052.208  10.116  78.125  3.083  3.083  5.000  3.722  -  -  -  118.516  7.204  1586.882 338.449 
Finland 1991  28  -31.667  -0.057  252.179  6.000  6.000  6.000  6.000  9.265  1.620  10.000  58.885 61.513  23276.260  5.657 
Hungary 1991 27  379.579  6.591  64.267  4.000  4.667  5.000  4.556  5.020  0.870  -  99.867  51.375  4686.407  7.207 
Indonesia 1997  26  188.329  0.499 594.037  1.600  3.000  2.833  2.478  2.685  -0.760  -  43.983  44.164  827.386  8.171 
Japan 1991  28  -252.229 -0.020  15508.460 5.000  6.000  5.000  5.333  6.810  0.950  8.512  223.709  153.530  32053.450 1.384 
Korea 1997  28 537.581  0.266  2644.443  4.100  2.550  2.150  2.933  -  -  5.298  63.100  62.312  8847.052 6.937 
Panama  1988  22  3.470 0.033  35.795 2.000  2.167  2.000 2.056  -  0.110  3.512  68.709  56.907  2837.189  5.809 
Poland  1990  28 49.604 0.189  183.027 3.679  1.862  4.000 3.180  5.325  0.700  -  5.361  4.448   37.150 
Senegal  1988  17  1.500 0.120  7.500 3.000  2.000  2.000 2.333  -  -  5.000  51.947  41.651  564.594  11.084 
Sweden  1991  28 -4.679 0.042  325.643 6.000  6.000  6.000 6.000  9.215  1.530  10.000  105.048  85.205  25455.040  6.543 
Venezuela 1994  28  -43.013  -0.111  360.436  3.000  5.000  4.000  4.000  2.635  -0.370  4.702  46.149  42.189  3450.689  38.853 
Zambia  1995  17  6.000 0.314  25.353 2.000  2.117  1.700 1.939  -  -0.200  - 64.679  9.063  492.290  84.339 
Zimbabwe 1995  25  -5.701  -0.102  41.768  3.000  3.750  2.000  2.917  -  -  5.417  40.611  20.505  634.638  14.696 
Average    21.467  -259.613 1.257  1914.325 3.596  3.604  3.570 3.590  5.527  0.445  6.528  75.303  49.584  7890.070  49.118   38
Table VII 
 
Average Impact of Corruption on Industry-level Price-Cost Margins during a Systemic Banking Crisis 
 
This table reports OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins during a crisis (DPCMREL). The independent variables are the 
average price-cost margin (PCM) before the crisis and several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) Corruption (ICRG), 2) Law and 
Order (ICRG), 3) Accountability (ICRG), 4) an average of these indices, and 5) domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher value means less 
corruption.  *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Relative change of industry-level price-cost margins in crisis (DPCMREL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
PCM before crisis  -2.448  -2.472  -2.475 -2.465 -2.453  -2.479  -2.487 -2.472 
 (0.433)***  (0.433)***  (0.433)***  (0.433)***  (0.433)*** (0.434)*** (0.434)***  (0.433)*** 
              
Ext. dep.*Bank credit          0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
         (0.000)*  (0.000)  (0.001)*  (0.001)* 
              
Ext. dep.*Corruption  -0.036        -0.052       
 (0.015)**        (0.017)***       
              
Ext. dep.*Law and Order    -0.013        -0.022     
   (0.020)        (0.021)     
              
Ext. dep.*Accountability      -0.013        -0.032   
     (0.016)        (0.020)   
              
Ext. dep.*Institutional index        -0.023        -0.042 
      (0.019)      (0.021)** 
            
Country-specific  effects?  Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y 
Industry-specific  effects?  Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y 
Observations  316 316 316  316 316 316 316  316 
R-squared 0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41 0.42  0.41 0.41 0.41   39
Table VIII 
 
Average Impact of Corruption on the Industry-Level Number of Establishments during a Systemic Banking Crisis 
 
This table reports OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the relative change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent 
variables are the average number of establishments (EST) before the crisis and several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) 
Corruption (ICRG), 2) Law and Order (ICRG), 3) Accountability (ICRG), 4) an average of these indices, and 5) domestic credit via banks to GDP. For the Corruption index, a 
higher value means less corruption.  *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Relative change of industry-level number of establishments in crisis (DESTREL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
EST before crisis  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Ext. dep.* Bank credit          -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
       (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
             
Ext.  dep.*Corruption  0.031      0.037     
  (0.015)**      (0.017)**     
             
Ext. dep.*Law and Order    0.005        0.005     
    (0.018)      (0.019)    
             
Ext.  dep.*Accountability     0.001      0.000   
     (0.015)      (0.020)   
             
Ext. dep.*Institutional index        0.014        0.017 
      (0.017)      (0.020) 
            
Country-specific  effects?  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry-specific  effects?  Y Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y 
Observations  260 260 260  260 260  260 260 260 
R-squared 0.51  0.50  0.50  0.50 0.51  0.50 0.50 0.51 
   40
Table IX 
 
Robustness: Average Impact of Corruption on Industry-Level Price-Cost Margins and the Number 
of Establishments, Using Different Measures of External Dependence 
 
This table reports OLS regressions. The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins during 
a crisis (DPCMREL) or the relative change in the number of establishments during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent 
variables are the average price-cost margin or number of establishments before the crisis and an interaction term of Corruption 
(ICRG) with several measures of external dependence. For the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption.  *, **. *** 
indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
Relative change of industry-level price-
cost margins in crisis (DPCMREL) 
Relative change of industry-level 
number of establishments in crisis 
(DESTREL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All  Young -/-  mature  All  Young -/- mature 
PCM before crisis  -3.712  -2.476     
 (1.161)***  (0.438)***     
        
Establishments before crisis     -0.000  -0.000 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
        
Ext. dep.*Corruption  0.014  -0.033  0.021  0.038 
 (0.054)  (0.020)  (0.036)  (0.022)* 
        
Country-specific effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-specific effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 340  303  278  246 
R-squared 0.39  0.41  0.45  0.53   41
Table X 
 
Robustness: Average Impact of Corruption on Industry-level Price Cost-Margins and Number of Establishments, Controlling for 
Domestic Credit 
 
The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the relative change in the number of establishments during a 
crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average price-cost margin before the crisis and the average number of establishments before the crisis, respectively. The common 
independent variables are several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) corruption (ICRG), 2) law and order (ICRG), 3) accountability 
(ICRG), 4) an average of these indices, and 5) domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. One percent tails of the 
DESTREL distribution in the basic sample have been dropped from the analysis to reduce the effect of outliers. *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Relative change of industry-level price-cost margins in crisis 
(DPCMREL) 
Relative change of industry-level number of establishments in 
crisis (DESTREL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
PCM before crisis  -2.431  -2.467  -2.468  -2.452         
 (0.433)***  (0.433)***  (0.433)***  (0.432)***         
                
Establishments before crisis          -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
         (0.000)  (0.000)*  (0.000)*  (0.000)* 
                
Ext. dep.*Domestic credit  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)*  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
                
Ext.  dep.*Corruption  -0.057      0.033     
  (0.019)***      (0.016)**     
                
Ext. dep.*Law and Order    -0.023        -0.003     
   (0.023)        (0.019)     
                
Ext. dep.*Accountability      -0.034        -0.016   
     (0.024)        (0.020)   
                
Ext. dep.*Institutional index        -0.045        0.006 
      (0.025)*      (0.020) 
          
Country-specific  effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry-specific  effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  316 316 316 316 257 257 257 257 
R-squared 0.42  0.41  0.41  0.42 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54   42
Table XI 
 
Robustness: Using other Corruption Indices 
 
The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the 
relative change in the number of establishments during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average PCM 
before the crisis and the average number of establishments before the crisis, respectively. Common independent variables are an 
interaction of the external dependence of young firms and domestic credit via banks to GDP and an interaction of the external 
dependence of young firms and Corruption (TI). Corruption (TI) is the average of the Corruption Perceptions Index over the years 
1995, 1996, and 1997 by Transparency International. One percent tails of the distribution of DPCMREL and DESTREL in the 
basic sample have been dropped from the analysis to reduce the effect of extreme values. For all Corruption indices, a higher value 
means less corruption. *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: 
Relative change of industry-level price-cost margins in crisis (DPCMREL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
PCM before crisis  -2.161  -2.603 -2.483 -2.172 -2.607 -2.483 
  (0.616)*** (0.600)*** (0.513)*** (0.620)*** (0.603)*** (0.515)*** 
        
Ext. dep.*Domestic credit        0.001  0.000  0.000 
       (0.000)*  (0.000)  (0.000) 
        
Ext. dep.*Corruption (Beck)  -0.017      -0.024     
 (0.012)      (0.011)**     
        
Ext. dep.*Corruption (TI)    -0.017      -0.020   
   (0.010)*      (0.011)*   
        
Ext. dep.*Corruption (KKZ)      -0.063      -0.070 
     (0.035)*     (0.035)** 
        
Country-specific  effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry-specific  effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  200 189 225 200 189 225 
R-squared 0.46  0.46  0.48 0.46 0.46 0.48 
 
Panel B: 
Relative change of industry-level EST in crisis (DESTREL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Establishments before crisis  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
            
Ext. dep.*Domestic credit        -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
       (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
            
Ext. dep.*Corruption (Beck)  -0.001      0.004     
 (0.012)      (0.013)     
            
Ext. dep.*Corruption (TI)    0.020      0.023   
   (0.007)***      (0.007)***   
            
Ext. dep.*Corruption (KKZ)      0.067      0.072 
     (0.025)***     (0.026)*** 
            
Country-specific effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-specific effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 189  163  208  189  163  208 
R-squared 0.53  0.74  0.56 0.53 0.74 0.56   43
Table XII 
 
Robustness: Average Impact of Corruption on the Industry-level Price-Cost Margins, Controlling 
for Country Variables 
 
The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the 
relative change in the number of institutions during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average PCM (number of 
establishments) before the crisis and several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) 
corruption (ICRG), 2) Domestic credit to GDP (WDI), 3) a corruption dummy, and 4) Domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI). For 
the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. Further independent variables are the Institutional Index (ICRG), 
Inflation (WDI), and GDP per capita (WDI). *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
  Relative change of industry-level price-cost margins in crisis 
(DPCMREL) 
Relative change of industry-level number of establishments 
in crisis (DESTREL) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
PCM before crisis  -1.916  -2.016  -2.468       
 (0.421)***  (0.414)***  (0.436)***       
          
Establishments 
before crisis 
    -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
       (0.000)*  (0.000)  (0.000) 
          
Ext. 
dep.*Corruption 
-0.050 -0.054    0.036  0.044   
 (0.018)***  (0.017)***    (0.019)*  (0.019)**   




   -0.049     0.150 
1 if above median, 0 
otherwise 
   (0.065)     (0.049)*** 
          
Ext. dep.*Bank 
credit 
0.001 0.001    -0.000  -0.001   
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.000)  (0.000)*   
          
Corruption 0.009  0.095    -0.069  -0.163   
 (0.020)  (0.039)**    (0.017)***  (0.060)***   
          
Bank credit  -0.001  -0.004    0.001  0.002   
 (0.001)***  (0.001)***    (0.000)*  (0.002)   
          
Total credit     0.012      -0.004   
   (0.002)***      (0.002)**   
          
Inflation   0.002      -0.003   
   (0.001)***      (0.001)***   
          
GDP per capita    -0.000      0.000   
   (0.000)***      (0.000)   
        
Country-specific 
effects? 
N N Y N N Y 
Industry-specific 
effects? 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  316 291 316 257 232 260 
R-squared 0.27  0.35  0.41 0.13 0.31 0.52   44
Table XIII 
 
Robustness: Average Impact of Corruption on the Relative Change in Industry-level Price-Cost 
Margins, Controlling for a Quadratic Interaction Term and Using Quantile Regressions 
 
This table reports OLS and quantile regressions. The dependent variable is the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins 
(PCM) during a crisis (DPCMREL). The independent variables are the average PCM before the crisis and several interaction terms 
of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) corruption (ICRG), 2) and corruption squared (ICRG). For the 
Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. For Model (1)-(3), the one percent tails of the distribution of DPCMREL 
have been dropped. *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Relative change of industry-level number of price-cost margins in crisis (DPCMREL) 
OLS Quantile  regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
High cor.  Low cor.  Full sample  Q(.1)  Q(.5)  Q(.9) 
PCM before crisis  -1.798  -1.777 -2.141 -0.473 -1.552 -3.169 
  (0.381)*** (0.430)*** (0.355)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.092)*** 
        
Ext. dep.*Corruption  -0.119  0.050  0.248  -0.031  -0.035  -0.063 
 (0.057)**  (0.036)  (0.110)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.004)*** 
        
Ext. dep.*Corruption^2      0.027       
     (0.013)**       
        
Country-specific  effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry-specific  effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  155 154 309 316 316 316 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.59  0.61 0.53 0.42 0.33 0.46   45
Table XIV 
 
Robustness: Average Impact of Corruption on Industry-level Price Cost-Margins and Number of 
Establishments, Controlling for Terms of Trade Changes 
  
 
The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) during a crisis (DPCMREL) or the 
relative change in the number of institutions during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average PCM (number of 
establishments) before the crisis and several interaction terms of external dependence of young firms and country-level variables 1) 
corruption (ICRG), 2) Domestic credit to GDP (WDI), 3) a corruption dummy, 4) Domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI), and 5) 
change in the terms of trade (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher value means less corruption. Further independent variables 
are the Institutional Index (ICRG), Inflation (WDI), and GDP per capita (WDI). *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Relative  change  of 
industry-level price-cost 
margins in crisis 
(DPCMREL) 
Relative change of 
industry-level number 
of establishments in 
crisis (DESTREL) 
 (1)  (2) 
    
PCM before crisis  -2.273   
 (0.454)***   




   (0.000) 
    
Ext. dep.*Corruption  -0.055  0.033 
 (0.018)***  (0.019)* 
    
Ext. dep.*Bank credit  0.001  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000) 
    
Terms of trade (change)  -0.612  1.615 
 (0.372)  (0.365)*** 
    
Corruption 0.065  -0.279 
 (0.044)  (0.072)*** 
    
Bank credit  -0.005  0.003 
 (0.001)***  (0.002)** 
    
Total credit   0.013  -0.014 
 (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
    
Inflation 0.002  -0.000 
 (0.001)***  (0.001) 
    
GDP per capita  -0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
    
Country-specific effects?  N  N 
Industry-specific effects?  Y  Y 
Observations 265 210 
R-squared 0.37  0.46   46
Table XV 
 
Robustness: Average Impact of Corruption on the Relative Change of the Price-Cost Margins and 
the Number of Establishments by Industry-Informativeness 
 
The dependent variable is either the relative change in industry-level price-cost margins (PCMs) during a crisis (DPCMREL) or 
the relative change in the number of institutions during a crisis (DESTREL). The independent variables are the average price-cost 
margin (PCM) (number of establishments) before the crisis and two interaction terms of industry informativeness with Corruption 
(ICRG) and external dependence of young firms and Domestic credit via banks to GDP (WDI). For the Corruption index, a higher 
value means less corruption. The information variable is taken from Huang (2005); a higher value means more informative. One 
percent tails of the DESTREL distribution in the basic sample have been dropped from the analysis to reduce the effect of extreme 
values. *, **. *** indicate significance at 10%., 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Relative change of industry-
level price-cost margins in crisis 
(DPCMREL) 
Relative change of industry-
level number of establishments 
in crisis (DESTREL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
PCM before crisis  -3.503  -2.640     
 (1.178)***  (0.442)***     
        
Establishments before crisis     -0.000  -0.000 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
        
Ext. dep.*Bank credit     0.001    -0.000 
   (0.000)*    (0.000) 
        
Info*Corruption 0.047  0.056  -0.016  -0.024 
 (0.017)***  (0.016)***  (0.014)  (0.014)* 
        
Country-specific effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-specific effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 328  316  269  257 
R-squared 0.41  0.43  0.44  0.54 
 